The vaccine procurement program is often cited as a possible example for this. During the Covid-19 pandemic, EU member countries ceded sovereignty to the Commission for the purchase of vaccines. The Commission was then given a budget and tasked with procurement, which enabled the EU to secure vaccines quickly, in large quantities and to distribute them fairly. It also increased the bloc’s negotiating power and prevented individual members from buying at the expense of others.
However, whether such a model is appropriate and feasible for defense remains a vital question. It took great courage to place the health of one’s own population in the hands of the Commission — a genuine transfer of sovereignty. And in the case of armaments, this is likely to be even more challenging. The relationship between arms manufacturers and governments is very close, and it has grown even more so over the decades.
Thus, a better analogy might be the banking system. Relations between governments and banks have also grown over the course of centuries. Banking is a core area of national sovereignty, and the link between finance and government debt is crucial.
And yet, the EU decided to create a banking union at the height of the euro area crisis — it had no choice. It had become clear that the embrace between governments and banks had been a fundamental reason behind the euro area’s fragility. And centralizing bank supervision was a big step.
However, governments found it much harder than perhaps expected to complete the banking union, and to truly break the funding-and-guarantee link between banks and their own national treasuries.
Much like the banking sector, there’s likely to be great resistance to Europeanizing and rationalizing arms procurement as well. The infighting will be significant, and the obstacles to integration won’t be easily overcome — as is the case with the still-to-be-completed banking union. And while some of these will be legitimate concerns, some will be bureaucratic and political turf war.
But the existential threat we are faced with should hopefully focus minds. It’s now clear to all parties that the current procurement model isn’t only expensive, fragmented and bureaucratic but, above all, it won’t be enough to counter the real threat posed by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Legitimate concerns need to be taken seriously, and the bureaucratic infighting needs to be pushed back.
It’s now time to think seriously — and quickly — about improving Europe’s defense capabilities and helping Ukraine. And a European armament commissioner is exactly what we need.
