U.K. Statement as delivered by Ambassador Corinne Kitsell
Thank you, Vanessa.
Distinguished colleagues,
We welcome your attendance at this side event of the second PrepCom of the 11th NPT Review Conference. The NPT is a cornerstone of the international peace and security system, of crucial importance to all States, and the AUKUS partners are fully committed to the full implementation of the NPT, in all its aspects.
On 13 March last year, the leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States announced the optimal pathway for Australia to acquire a conventionally-armed, nuclearpowered submarine capability. At the highest political level, our Leaders committed to ensuring our approach set the highest non-proliferation standard and would be conducted in a manner fully consistent with our respective non-proliferation obligations and commitments.
I will make some framing remarks on the place of naval nuclear propulsion within the NPT and IAEA architecture.
Colleagues,
Naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the NPT. Indeed, a mechanism was provided for this in Article 14 of the draft Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This model agreement was approved by the IAEA’s Board of Governors in 1971 and is the basis for CSAs agreed with States. The Board of Governors authorises the Director General to negotiate and implement States’ CSAs and Australia’s CSA was approved by the Board in 1974.
Furthermore, the IAEA has the authority, under its Statute, to negotiate directly with Member States on the establishment, and application, of safeguards and verification arrangements.
The NPT, the IAEA Statute, the CSA and, in Australia’s case also the Additional Protocol (AP), provide a firm legal basis and obligation for the IAEA Director General and Secretariat to engage directly, and confidentially to protect sensitive information, with Member States in the development and implementation of safeguards. The global nuclear non-proliferation regime relies on such engagement taking place.
Indeed, it has been the longstanding practice of the IAEA to negotiate directly and bilaterally with Member States on their own safeguards and verification arrangements. There is no reason why Australia’s negotiations on its Article 14 arrangement, under its own CSA, should depart from this practice. In fact, there is no basis for any other approach that would involve other states in the negotiation and such an approach would only lead to the politicisation of the process. I believe Ambassador Holgate will talk more about this.
As such, Australia has confirmed that its acquisition of a naval nuclear propulsion capability will occur within the framework of its CSA and AP with the Agency.
I should also refer to the statements and reports made by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi. The Director General confirmed that Article 14 of Australia’s CSA allows for naval nuclear propulsion. He further underscored that the Agency’s role in relation to naval nuclear propulsion is foreseen in the existing legal framework, and that this is within its statutory competences.
In his statement of 14 March 2023, DG Grossi emphasised that the Agency will continue to be guided by its verification mandate in relation to this matter, exercising its powers in an independent, impartial, and professional manner – as we would all want and expect. The IAEA’s independence and technical authority is vital to maintaining the nuclear nonproliferation regime – it is essential that this be upheld without politicisation or interference.
So, to summarise, Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines will occur within the NPT and within Australia’s safeguards agreements, as well as all AUKUS partners’ respective obligations.
Nonetheless, we are deeply conscious that Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines comes with a responsibility to set a strong precedent for states that might also seek to acquire this technology. Whilst we intend to set the highest non-proliferation standard should others follow; this does not mean we intend to create or impose a template arrangement on other states. It will be up to each individual Member State to negotiate directly with the IAEA on safeguards and verification arrangements such that the Agency can meet is safeguards objectives. Australia’s approach will include a robust package of safeguards and verification measures which will enable the IAEA to meet its technical safeguards objectives in Australia: no diversion of nuclear material, no misuse of nuclear facilities and no undeclared nuclear material or activity. That outcome is the high non-proliferation precedent we seek.
It is also important to also note that, once agreed, Australia’s arrangement will be transmitted to the Board of Governors of the IAEA for appropriate action, as the IAEA Director General has stated on a number of occasions, including in his last report on Australia’s NNP program (GOV/INF/2023/10). When Australia’s Article 14 arrangement comes before the Board of Governors, in the fullness of time, AUKUS partners expect that arrangement to be judged on its non-proliferation merits: in other words, on whether it enables the IAEA to fulfil its technical objectives.
I turn now to my colleague, Amb. Biggs who will expand upon Australia’s progress. Thank you.
Australian Statement as delivered by Ambassador Ian Biggs
Thank you all for joining us today. Thanks to my colleague, Ambassador Vanessa Wood, for her kind introduction and to Ambassador Kitsell of the United Kingdom for her remarks on naval nuclear propulsion (NNP) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
As many of you may recall, and as Ambassador Wood noted in her introductory remarks, the AUKUS partners held a side-event on NNP at the 2023 NPT PrepCom in Vienna. Following on from the updates provided at last year’s side event, I would like to further update you on progress with Australia’s NNP program and our ongoing commitment to strengthening the integrity of the global non-proliferation regime.
What is the ‘Optimal Pathway’?
To recap, the ‘optimal pathway’ is the phased approach we have developed to provide Australia with a replacement submarine capability as we transition our existing fleet of six diesel-powered submarines to eight conventionally armed, nuclear‑powered submarines, beginning last year and continuing until the second half of this century.
Under the first phase currently underway, the AUKUS partners are making progress on building capacity and familiarity for Australia to safely operate, maintain, and steward nuclear-powered submarines by increasing UK and US SSN port visits to Australia. Once Australia is ready to operate its own sovereign fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, we will then acquire Virginia Class submarines from the United States. Acquiring US Virginia Class submarines will ensure there is no capability gap during the retirement of Australia’s existing diesel-powered submarine fleet.
While this is underway, the AUKUS partners will be developing the ‘SSN-AUKUS’, which will be the future submarine for both Australia and the UK. The UK will deliver its first Britishbuilt SSN-AUKUS in the late 2030s; and the first Australian-built SSN-AUKUS will be completed in the early 2040s.
Naval Nuclear Propulsion and our Non-Proliferation Approach
Australia announced in March last year (2023) that we intended to negotiate an arrangement under Article 14 of our Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), as part of developing a non-proliferation approach for Australia’s NNP program.
Formal technical consultations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Secretariat on Australia’s Article 14 approach commenced in May last year (2023). The most recent round of the consultations between Australia and the IAEA Secretariat took place in May 2024. Our consultations with the IAEA are ongoing.
Matters covered in the consultations have included: legal and technical aspects of an Article 14 arrangement for Australia, including the arrangement’s form and structure; ways to facilitate verification and monitoring activities, including voluntary transparency measures; and discussion of Safeguards by Design best practice.
We recognise that the acquisition of a NNP capability by a non-nuclear weapon state is a new development.
Australia’s non-proliferation approach will operate within the framework of Australia’s CSA and Additional Protocol (AP) – as previously described by Ambassador Kitsell. Our Article 14 arrangement with the IAEA will enable the IAEA to meet its technical objectives and have confidence that no diversion of nuclear material has occurred. When the arrangement comes before the IAEA Board of Governors in the fullness of time, we expect it to be judged on its non-proliferation merits. In other words, on whether it enables the IAEA to fulfil its technical objectives.
To be absolutely clear, while we are working to make sure Australia’s arrangement meets the highest non-proliferation standard, this does not mean we intend to create or impose a model arrangement on others. We recognise that all IAEA member states share a strong interest in protecting their fundamental right to engage bilaterally, and in-confidence with the IAEA, on safeguards and verification arrangements within the framework of their safeguards agreements. This is also in accordance with the Agency’s statutory mandate and authority to hold confidential discussions with Member States on safeguards implementation issues.
When developing an Article 14 arrangement for Australia or another state, the IAEA will need to account for state-specific factors – a one-size-fits-all approach would not work given the differences between NNP programs. To ensure Australia’s Article 14 arrangement is fit for purpose, the technical considerations in developing the arrangement will need to reflect factors that are specific to Australia’s NNP program, such as: the fact that Australia has committed not to undertake enrichment, reprocessing or fuel fabrication in support of our NNP program; that Australia will receive complete, welded reactor power units that are designed so that the removal of any nuclear material would be extremely difficult and render the power unit, and submarine, inoperable; and that the nuclear fuel Australia will receive cannot be used in nuclear weapons without further chemical processing, requiring facilities that Australia does not have – and will not seek.
A few words on progress with Australia’s NNP program
As I touched upon earlier, the AUKUS partners are currently focused on building Australia’s capacity to safely operate, maintain, and steward nuclear-powered submarines.
To recap some of the major developments since our last side-event at the 2023 PrepCom:
In December 2023, the United States Congress passed the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act which, amongst other important national defence initiatives, includes substantial enabling provisions for AUKUS. In addition to authorising the transfer of three conventionally armed Virginia class submarines to Australia, the Act also contains provisions to enhance skills development across the partners’ workforces and to lift the capacity of our respective submarine industrial bases.
Australia is growing our workforce to build Australia’s capability to safely and securely maintain and operate its future submarines, with more than 20 Royal Australian Navy personnel currently in the US Navy Submarine training system.
In March this year, Australia announced the selection of industry partners for the build and sustainment of Australia’s future conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. Cohorts of Australian industry personnel are conducting placements in the UK and US throughout 2024.
In April this year, the AUKUS partners announced initiatives to support increased education and training opportunities to develop the workforce needed to support Australia’s future NNP capability. This includes a maintenance activity to be conducted on a US nuclear-powered submarine in Australia, which is scheduled to occur later this year. Australian industry personnel will also be involved in supporting this activity to continue to grow the submarine sustainment workforce and supply chain. As IAEA Director General Grossi has said in his statements, Australia and the IAEA are continuing to engage to make sure relevant technical measures are in place ahead of any such activity under Australia’s safeguards agreements with the IAEA, consistent with the Agency’s mandate and with its longstanding practice.
Australia has also committed funding to the US and UK industrial base to support increased production and maintenance capacity of the AUKUS partners to ensure there is no capability gap, by boosting the resilience of nuclear-powered submarine supply chains for all AUKUS partners. This funding will be provided in accordance with AUKUS partners’ respective legal obligations, including their non-proliferation commitments.
I note that in April, the AUKUS defence ministers released a joint statement which, in addition to providing an update on a number of NNP-related initiatives, outlined principles and models to engage additional partners on specific advanced capability projects under AUKUS Pillar II. AUKUS defence ministers also announced they are considering cooperation with Japan under Pillar II. Pillar II, and any cooperation with additional partners on Pillar II projects, will not include NNP information, technology, or materials. I want to stress that Pillar I relating to Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines will remain exclusively a trilateral partnership between Australia, the UK and US.
Transparency
In conclusion, I want to express my thanks for your attendance at this event, and your interest in this matter. This side event is part of our continued commitment to engage, regularly and transparently, on Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarines. Transparency as well as strict and full adherence to our international obligations is key to our approach.
In the IAEA context, AUKUS partners will keep providing updates on relevant developments at the Board of Governors and General Conference – as we have done consistently since AUKUS was first announced in September 2021. We fully support the Director General’s commitment to continue to report to the IAEA Board on Australia’s NNP program, as he judges appropriate, and welcome constructive discussions in the Board on the basis of such reports. We will continue to seek opportunities to engage and address genuine questions in other fora – such as this side event.
There is a lot of misinformation and disinformation floating about concerning AUKUS – a problem which my colleague Ambassador Laura Holgate is going to address more specifically, because we really value the opportunity to get the facts out there. My thanks again for your kind attention.
U.S. Statement as delivered by Ambassador Laura S.H. Holgate
It is great to see so many delegates in this room for this discussion, which exemplifies the transparency that Australia and the AUKUS partners have brought to this issue. We welcome open, fact-based dialogue intended to build understanding of naval nuclear propulsion and what it entails, at the same that we strongly reject some States efforts to mischaracterize and undermine the transparency that the AUKUS partners bring to this issue. You’ve heard from Ambassador Kitsell and Ambassador Biggs on the affirmative case for AUKUS and how it fits within the respective legal and policy frameworks of the AUKUS partners. My role today, as it was last year, is to address some of the misrepresentations that some voices continue to put forward here in Geneva, in Vienna, and in other venues regarding AUKUS and naval nuclear propulsion.
This discussion gives us another chance to set the record straight.
First, let me be clear. The transfer of highly enriched uranium from a nuclear weapon state to a non-nuclear weapon state is not a violation of the NPT. Several nuclear weapon states, including the United States, the former Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and Russia (as an independent nation) have transferred highly enriched uranium fuel to nonnuclear weapon states for use in nuclear reactors – just as it will occur under AUKUS. Nothing about the enrichment level, the quantity, or any other technical parameter equates reactor fuel with a nuclear weapon under the NPT or prohibits the transfer of enriched nuclear material of any enrichment level.
Second, Article 14 is not a “loophole,” and its purpose is clear. Naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the NPT and discussed during the negotiations to develop the model CSA in INFCIRC/153, which has been repeatedly confirmed by the IAEA secretariat, including by Director General Grossi. These discussions, under IAEA Board of Governors Committee 22, are well documented and are accessible to all IAEA Member States in the INFCIRC/153 negotiating history. I urge you to review the excellent, impartial, and unbiased analysis done by the Vienna Center for Nonproliferation and Disarmament on this issue.
Third, given that both the transfer of highly enriched uranium and the use of Article 14 for naval nuclear propulsion are legal and were foreseen by the drafters of the NPT and Model CSA, the combination does not render the activity illegal. DG Grossi has repeatedly addressed the use of Article 14 in this context. As he said in May 2023 when he noted that, “[t]he Agency’s role in this process is foreseen in the existing legal framework and falls strictly within its statutory competences.” Calling into question whether the IAEA has the capability to make such a judgment is a blatant attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the Secretariat and the Agency as a whole. Furthermore, Director General Grossi explicitly addressed the transfer question in June 2023 when he stated that “the use of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under a CSA, whether produced domestically or imported, for nuclear-powered submarines was envisaged by Member States…and was agreed and reflected in paragraph 14 of INFCIRC/153, and included subsequently in the CSAs approved by the Board”.
Fourth, Australia’s Article 14 arrangement will not remove nuclear material from IAEA oversight. Australia is pursuing with the IAEA a package of robust verification and monitoring measures to enable the IAEA to continue to fully meet the technical objectives and practical effect of IAEA safeguards including verifying that there is 1) no diversion of nuclear material, 2) no undeclared nuclear material or activity, and 3) no misuse of facilities throughout the submarine’s lifecycle. Australia’s Additional Protocol also provides the Agency with further tools to verify the absence of undeclared facilities or activities and that no diversion to illicit applications has taken place during the period in which under Article 14 to the relevant nuclear material.
Despite what some have argued, the type of engagement that Australia and the AUKUS partners are having with the IAEA is not a new phenomenon and does not require a separate parallel review process outside of the Board. Indeed, as DG Grossi has repeatedly stated at the Board and specifically documented in 2023/Note 44, the IAEA already engaged in negotiations with one of its Member States on an Article 14 arrangement in the past, in a bilateral manner just as it is currently doing with Australia and is separately engaging with Brazil regarding prospective special safeguards procedures relevant to nuclear material while in use for naval nuclear propulsion. In fact, Australia’s negotiations are conducted in a bilateral format with only Australia and the IAEA present – the United States and the United Kingdom do not participate during the bilateral negotiations. As Ambassador Kitsell noted earlier, Australia’s Article 14 arrangement will be presented to the Board for appropriate action when the Agency deems it is ready to do so.
Some member states have claimed a tradition or principle that all new safeguards approaches have been developed in a consensus approach by the Board of Governors and that, as such, that precedent requires an intergovernmental process. Firstly, this claim is false, as Laura Rockwood – the former head of Safeguards for the IAEA’s Office of Legal Affairs – has documented at length. Secondly, none of the efforts which developed new approaches were used to disrupt or affect bilateral negotiations on safeguards implementation arrangements, authorized under the existing legal framework.
The AUKUS approach to safeguards and verification is specific to the nature of the program. It is not intended to define or constrain future naval propulsion programs.
It does, however, reflect five key principles by which the U.S. plans to evaluate any arrangements for naval nuclear propulsion by a non-nuclear weapons state, including those related to AUKUS:
Can the IAEA meet all of its safeguards technical objectives throughout the naval nuclear program lifecycle with the tools and authorities available under that arrangement?
Does the country have a strong and consistent track record of nonproliferation and compliance with IAEA safeguards?
Has the country been engaged with and responsive to the IAEA Secretariat and kept the Board of Governors and Member States informed in a timely manner throughout its naval nuclear propulsion process?
Is the mechanism for the verification arrangement appropriately derived from the country’s comprehensive safeguards agreement (in Australia’s case, Article 14)?
Has the country provided the IAEA with the types of additional information and access that are granted under the Additional Protocol?
The United States believes this information and access are even more important for the Agency in the context of naval nuclear programs. We fully expect Australia’s arrangement, once negotiated, will meet these principles based on Australia’s technical approach. Other naval propulsion programs elsewhere will require those countries to develop their own case-specific measures, but we believe the safeguards outcomes should be the same and satisfy these principles.
Finally, we’ve heard claims from some Member States about purported safety or other legal and geopolitical issues that naval nuclear propulsion in the context of AUKUS will supposedly undermine. In fact, AUKUS partners will implement the program in full compliance with established safety principles.
We recognize that safety concerns, including the risk of releases of radiation, are a topic which is at the forefront of many minds given the ongoing nuclear safety and security concerns in Ukraine, the history of Chornobyl and other nuclear incidents, and the legacy of nuclear weapons testing.
That said, these concerns must be considered within the context of the specific technology being discussed. For over 60 years, the United Kingdom and the United States have operated more than 500 naval nuclear reactors that have collectively travelled over 240 million kilometers without a reactor accident or release of radioactive material that adversely affect human health or the quality of the environment.
Needless to say, the submarine technology that will be transferred to Australia is state-of-the-art and will not release tritium (or any other material) into sensitive marine environments.
AUKUS is fully consistent with the spirit of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. All the AUKUS partners support Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and see them as important symbols of our commitment to a rules-based, international nonproliferation framework.
The AUKUS partnership does not involve any nuclear weapons. As a non nuclear-weapon state, Australia does not – and will not – seek to acquire any nuclear weapon. Naval nuclear propulsion is not prohibited by Nuclear Weapon Free Zone treaties and these treaties do not have any bearing on the AUKUS partners’ plan to provide Australia with a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability.
This event and the many other briefings, documents, statements, and presentations made available to Member States and the public are evidence of the priority AUKUS partners place on transparency and open discussion. We continue to believe that the intergovernmental process on this matter must be driven within the established roles and procedures, within the IAEA Board of Governors and at the Director General’s discretion and direction, and must be underpinned not by fears and fantasies, but by facts. Thank you.
