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Nathalie Tocci is director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali and a part-time professor at the European University Institute. Her latest book, “A Green and Global Europe,” is out with Polity.
No major European foreign policy speech or document has ever neglected to mention the existential importance of multilateralism and the rules-based order. The rhetoric remains unscathed to this day, and multilateralism is still the knee-jerk corollary to anything Europeans say about their role in the world.
But in practice, Europe is doing little to prevent the tragic death of global governance.
At various junctures throughout its history, Europe stood out as multilateralism’s staunchest defender. And at no point was this clearer than during the most recent Republican administrations in the United States, when Washington turned its back on international rules, regimes and organizations in favor of unilateral action.
During former U.S. President George W. Bush’s first administration, Europeans proudly spoke in favor of the U.N. and international law, notably in connection to the war in Iraq. Many will recall then French Minister of Foreign Affairs Dominique de Villepin passionately defending the “temple” that is the U.N. as the “guardian” of “conscience” and “an ideal.” And during Donald Trump’s time in the White House, as he trampled the Paris climate agreement, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Health Organization and much more, it was then German Chancellor Angela Merkel who stood out as the champion of the rules-based free world.
When current U.S. President Joe Biden then came into office in 2020, there was genuine hope of a multilateral revival, organized in concentric circles, from the G7 to the G20 to broader international organizations. Concrete results were achieved, with the commitments made at the U.N. Climate Change Conference COP26 in Glasgow, as well as the global minimum tax rate on multinationals, which was adopted by the G7, the G20 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
However, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the escalating rivalry between the U.S. and China, and the global south’s growing resentment toward those in the north, the global fracture has only deepened. COP27 in Sharm-el-Sheikh failed to raise the bar on climate — let alone spur any concrete action — and this year’s COP28 in Dubai promises to lower global ambition further. All this is happening while the devastating effects of climate change rage across the planet, triggering forces of resistance to radically alter tactics, as they opt for climate doomsday scenarios aimed at instilling paralysis now that blunt denialism no longer works.
And though the green energy transition is happening, it is now being paradoxically spurred on by bipolar competition — between the U.S. and China — more than multilateral cooperation. Once the EU’s pride, global climate diplomacy is openly stalling.
Meanwhile, after being blocked for many years, the WTO has died a silent death. China’s state capitalism was always going to be an impossibly big bite to swallow, yet, it’s Washington — first under Trump and then Biden — that has put the nail in the free trade coffin. And here too, the EU — once the champion of free trade — is scrambling to readjust its philosophy (and change its DNA).
While showcasing the free trade agreements it has recently concluded with Chile, New Zealand and Kenya, European leaders have increasingly been admitting that economic security now trumps free trade. Sure, this is “de-risking” and not “decoupling,” “open strategic autonomy” and not autarky, protection and not protectionism. But call it what you may, the European variant of America’s “small yard and high fence” means a European buy-in to the end of free trade.
The situation is even more dire at the U.N. The U.N. Security Council has been paralyzed for much of its history, with moments of consensus in the 1990s and 2000s being the exception, not the rule. But its fracture now appears beyond the point of no return, with the cascading divisions between the West and Russia, the U.S. and China blocking virtually all decisions of strategic relevance.
The U.N. General Assembly a few weeks ago was a sorry show, with harrowingly empty rooms greeting the few global leaders, like German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who bothered to turn up. Others, like British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and French President Emmanuel Macron, skipped the annual gathering altogether.
But regional organizations are faring no better. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is on the verge of collapse, with Russia obstructing approval of the consensus-based organization’s budget. And even global organizations like the G20 — which were meant to become the multilateral expression of a multipolar world — are unable to ignite common action.
True, Indonesia’s G20 presidency last year and India’s this year both managed to miraculously pull off a leaders’ declaration, despite the fissures caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. And New Delhi successfully ushered the African Union into the bloc, while Prime Minister Narendra Modi, alongside other world leaders, leveraged the absence of Russian President Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping to launch a spice route joining India, the Middle East and Europe, in response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. However, there is little action involving the G20 as a whole — including on economic or climate imperatives, which can’t be easily extricated from political and strategic ones.
The only groupings that actually have wind in their sails are those that reflect, rather than supersede, current global cleavages, such as the G7-plus and the BRICS-plus.
For years we debated whether multipolarity would strengthen or weaken multilateralism. Now we know it has killed it. And Europe alone doesn’t have the clout to save multilateralism from its fate amid a fracturing world. But the sad truth is that it isn’t even trying.
While the EU invests in mini-lateral groupings like the G7, devises alternative Pan-European groupings like the European Political Community, and is looking to revive enlargement, it has quietly divested from multilateral organizations that span geopolitical divides. Of course, no one would expect Europe to engage with Russia amid war on the Continent. But for the time being, a new European security architecture must be rebuilt not with, but to protect ourselves from, Russia.
The problem, however, is that Europe is failing to meaningfully engage countries that resist fully aligning with its preferences. Despite genuinely believing in the need to reach out to countries in the global south, the EU’s efforts have been underwhelming. And diplomatically, there is yet to be a sustained and coordinated push to listen to these countries’ resentments and needs.
Whereas Europeans had loudly rebuked Bush’s “with us or against us” ultimatum, they themselves are now ill at ease with countries that are “neither with us nor against us.” This goes for security, where faced with upheaval in the Sahel and pushback against European (and French) policies in the region, the bloc is now struggling to define an alternative course of action. Likewise in the Middle East, where it wasn’t just Israel that was caught off-guard by a dramatic re-eruption of violence, as both the East and Europe had progressively disengaged from the region. And though, economically, there is still the Global Gateway — which promises to deliver €300 billion and now interlocks with the EU-Middle East-India project — it is yet to deliver visible results despite being unveiled two years ago.
Finally, while Europe has spent the last five years rightly putting the Green Deal at the core of its internal action, the Continent is nowhere near where it should be externally when it comes to financing mitigation and adaptation — especially in Africa.
Europe alone cannot save the U.N.-centered rules-based international order. But it can, and should, do much more to save multilateralism and international cooperation with countries in the global south — and save itself in doing so.
