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Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor at POLITICO Europe.
KYIV — “All warfare is based on deception,” according to Sun Tzu.
In his book “The Art of War,” the ancient Chinese military strategist highlighted the importance of tricking the enemy. “Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must appear inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near,” he counseled.
And this is exactly what Ukraine is trying to do ahead of a counteroffensive that may later be seen as the hinge of this war.
We are now firmly in a crucial phase of deception, much as in 1943, when the British mounted Operation Mincemeat to confuse Germany as to where in southern Europe the allies would strike. Or, in 1944, when the Western allies used tanks made of plywood and canvas to launch Operation Bodyguard — an elaborate disinformation campaign involving double agents and radio traffic to mask where they intended to land in Nazi-occupied France. Both were successful.
Similarly, today, on the eve of a much-anticipated counteroffensive that’s only weeks away — most likely mid-May, if the ground is dry enough, or possibly early June — Ukraine is sending as many false signals as it can to confuse Russia as to when and where it will strike in the country’s east, along a crescent-shaped frontline that now stretches hundreds of kilometers.
Journalists are being restricted from visiting huge swathes of land, with some more unscrupulous Western news outlets trying to bribe individual units and commanders to gain access — efforts that don’t always pan out.
Could the main thrust surprise everyone and come in the northeastern oblast of Kharkiv, where Russian defenses collapsed last fall, in the face of an unexpected and well-disguised attack that even Ukrainian ground commanders weren’t informed of until just before the strike?
Ukraine hasn’t followed up in the region much since then, and the front has stood out for its lack of activity — possibly an attempt to lull the Russians. The aim of a strike here would be to drive into Luhansk, force Russia out of Severodonetsk and threaten Bakhmut.
But the strategic gains that would come with success in the north aren’t comparable to what could be gained by a southern push from either — or both — Kherson and Zaporizhia, pushing toward Mariupol, Berdiansk, Melitopol and Tokmak, with the aim of cutting the so-called land bridge connecting mainland Russia and the southern Ukrainian territories it occupies via the Crimean isthmus, annexed by Moscow in 2014.
Russia seems to fear a southern thrust most, no doubt worried that success there would, indeed, set Ukraine up to target Crimea shortly after — something retired United States generals Ben Hodges and David Petraeus have been loudly advocating for. In recent interviews, Hodges told POLITICO that he believes Crimea is the key to ending the war with a colossal Russian military defeat. And writing for the Daily Telegraph, he recently said that “Ukrainian forces should be supported this summer in their endeavour to take back Crimea, which would lead to the total collapse of Russia’s campaign.”
The Pentagon, however — including U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley — has been consistently doubtful of Ukraine’s ability to reclaim the peninsula militarily, suggesting it would be an overreach.
Yet, according to open-source satellite imagery and Ukrainian field commanders who talked with POLITICO, Russian forces have been fortifying Zaporizhzhia oblast and building up defenses in recent weeks — and they have been shoring up defenses in northern Crimea for months. As Vadym Skibitskiy, deputy head of Ukraine’s military intelligence directorate, said in February: “We are trying to drive a wedge into the Russian front in the south — between Crimea and the Russian mainland.”
But were his remarks a bluff or a double bluff?
Or, interestingly, could the main thrust come in Donetsk, at Bakhmut itself — which might explain why Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has shunned Western counsel to disengage from the months-long battle that’s led to high casualties on both sides. Many analysts have cast doubt on the wisdom of holding the shattered frontline town against relentless assault, but Zelenskyy’s argued it’s better to “inflict maximum possible damage upon the occupier” — i.e. kill as many Russians as they can, draining them for the counteroffensive to come, wherever that might be. So, why not Bakhmut?
Still, there’s the high concentration of Russian forces to consider there, and most analysts seem to think the fight in Bakhmut has forced Russia to weaken its defenses elsewhere — and those gaps are where Ukrainian forces are likely to head.
In addition to all these possibilities, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Maliar sought to sow even more confusion last week, playing down the idea of a single major Ukrainian thrust, suggesting on her Telegram channel that “it is incorrect to speak narrowly about a counteroffensive. This is a huge complex of actions and measures carried out by the Armed Forces.” She added that “the Armed Forces are currently not preparing one thing — for a specific time in a specific direction. The Armed Forces prepare the entire complex of defensive and counteroffensive measures every day.”
And Ukraine certainly has many alternatives along the crescent-shaped line, but most military analysts still seem to agree that one major thrust and a feint is most likely, as the country doesn’t have sufficient tanks and armor to punch through deeply if they’re dissipated.
So, as Ukraine’s top officials finalize their plans and look to mislead with visual deception techniques, radio traffic, ground activity and inactivity, as well as public statements, they’re acutely aware they need big territorial gains, and that the fate of this war may well hinge on this counteroffensive — more for geopolitical reasons than anything else.
“Moderate territorial gains,” which — according to the recent leak of classified U.S. intelligence documents — is what the Pentagon is predicting, could stretch Western impatience, adding impetus to the behind-the-scenes maneuvering already underway by some allies, as well as some within the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden, to coax and cajole Ukraine and Russia into talks.
Ukrainian officials and lawmakers who were recently in Washington for Biden’s Summit for Democracy got that distinct impression — of the clock ticking — in their talks with U.S. State Department and National Security Council officials. After the meetings, Ukrainian opposition lawmaker and former Deputy Prime Minister Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze said she was left anxious about the “continuation of the same level of U.S. support to Ukraine after this financial year” — which, for the U.S. federal budget, is September.
Klympush-Tsintsadze told POLITICO she came away with unanswered questions on how the U.S. presidential election campaign — which, in effect, has already started — may impact support, and she got “no clear positive sense on Ukraine’s future NATO membership.” Instead, U.S. officials batted away such queries, talking about security guarantees for Ukraine after the guns have gone silent.
“They indicated they have other priorities, and they need alliance unity — and that there is no unity on that issue,” she said. This contradicts what NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said last week while visiting Kyiv — namely that all member countries have agreed Ukraine will eventually join the transatlantic military alliance. But, then again, the key word there may well be “eventually.”
In the responses to all their questions, Klympush-Tsintsadze and her colleagues sensed many crucial decisions were on hold with the Americans — as well as the French and Germans — wanting to wait and see how the counteroffensive pans out, and to start incentivizing negotiations if it fares indifferently. “It was everywhere, on Capitol Hill and in the Executive Branch — not that they said it out loud. The whole feeling was like, ‘You have another push with the counteroffensive, and then we’ll see how things develop.’”
Ukraine has heard such sounds of Western fatigue, and background noise about negotiations, before, when there was fear of a stalemate last fall. But it silenced these worries with highly effective counteroffensives around Kharkiv in the north and Kherson in the south.
And Ukraine will need just as much success this time around — likely more.
