MODERATOR: (Via interpreter) We will start the Japan-U.S. 2+2 joint press conference. We will start with initial comments by Foreign Minister Kamikawa, Defense Minister Kihara, Secretary of State Blinken, Secretary of Defense Austin in this order, followed by Q&A.
Minister Kamikawa.
FOREIGN MINISTER KAMIKAWA: (Via interpreter) Welcoming Secretary Blinken and Secretary Austin here in Tokyo, we held the Japan-U.S. 2+2 meeting after one and a half years since the last time. We were able to have some very productive discussion at the ministerial level. The international community is increasingly deeply divided. Developments that shake the free and open international order based on rule of law are continuing. We must deepen and grow our alliance and enhance deterrence power in order to thoroughly defend the existing international order.
We are standing at a historic turning point, a critical juncture where today’s decision will determine our future. Prime Minister Kishida’s official visit to the United States this April was of historical significance, elevating the Japan-U.S. alliance to an unprecedented height. We were able to show in a powerful way domestically and globally that Japan and the United States are global partners. The Japan-U.S. 2+2 meeting this time was a valuable opportunity to align and coordinate between our two countries on perception of difficult regional security environment, as well as to operationalize the outcome of prime minister’s visit to the United States, thereby further developing Japan-U.S. alliance.
On regional security environment, we agreed that China’s external stance and military actions aiming to recreate international order to meet its own interests are posing serious concern for us, for the region, as well as the international community. We also shared the concern over further strategic military cooperation between Russia and China. Moreover, we reaffirmed our commitment for complete denuclearization of North Korea, and we also showed the concern of Russia-North Korea military cooperation, including possible military assistance from Russia to North Korea.
Recognizing the regional security environment developments, we discussed cooperation in command and control, collaboration in defense equipment and advanced technology, in partnership with likeminded countries, as well as a presence in the Nansei Shoto Islands and cross-domain operation, and other broad-based areas. As for alliance coordination, we have proceeded to have more efficient and facilitated coordination since our last 2+2 meeting. Japan and the U.S. will continue to consider and improve the ACM, or Alliance Coordination Mechanism, to further – effectively.
As the competent ministry on foreign policy, we will engage as necessary in strengthening cooperation between JJOC and the U.S. side command. Strengthening defense industry foundation, making supply chain more resilient, and expanding coproduction directly lead to deterrence and response capabilities for Japan-U.S. alliance.
At the 2+2 this time, we were able to show ministerial guidance forward based on the discussion under DICAS. We also shared the awareness that to achieve our goal of realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific, it is indispensable for Japan and United States to work on partnership with likeminded countries, making use of the RAA, which entered into force last year. Various operational cooperation and joint training are proceeding with Australia.
With ROK, in addition to bilateral cooperation, including the outcome of Japan-U.S.-ROK summit last August, cooperation is ongoing in various fields. Earlier this month, I, together with Minister Kihara, held Japan-Philippines 2+2 meeting and signed the bilateral RAA. Based on the results of Japan-U.S.-Philippines summit in April, held for the first time ever, our trilateral cooperation will be further promoted. As the ministry responsible for foreign policy, we will promote further the cooperation as secretary – as security-related – to further conclude the security-related agreements and also actively make use of OSA.
We again confirm the importance of mitigating impacts on the local communities, including Okinawa. We also confirmed that in order to avoid the continuous usage of the Futenma air field, a move to Henoko is the only solution. I again ask the U.S. side for safe operation giving utmost consideration for impact on the local community, as well as how to appropriately respond to incidents and accidents, including early notification and cooperation to – and environment. And we affirmed to closely work together.
I also mentioned the recent incidents in Okinawa and stated that they were truly regrettable. What is important is to make sure that the measures the U.S. announced are to be implemented, leading to the prevention of recurrence. We have concurred that we, the minister level, will also follow it up properly.
At this 2+2, WPS was discussed for the first time. As mentioned in the joint statement, we will pursue WPS in the joint exercise and other bilateral activities. As a person engaged in WPS, I am truly delighted. Based on the joint statement, we will continue to commit to the WPS.
Now, separately from Japan-U.S. 2+2, this time for the first time we conducted Japan-U.S. ministerial (inaudible) meeting focusing on extended deterrence. At this meeting, we have been able to deepen our discussion through extended deterrence consultations between our two countries, and we were able to deepen the understanding at the ministerial level on extended deterrence. And we were able to put forward a further strengthened message in and out of Japan. In order to fully defend international order, we had need to further deepen and develop Japan-U.S. alliance and enhance deterrence. Together with Minister Kihara and the two secretaries, I will commit myself firmly.
MODERATOR: (Via interpreter) Minister Kihara.
DEFENSE MINISTER KIHARA: (Via interpreter) Thank you very much. With the gratifying presence of Secretary Austin and Secretary Blinken, we engaged in a straightforward discussion on how to further fortify the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. alliance. As Minister Kamikawa mentioned, the security environment surrounding us has never been so severe, and in order to maintain the (inaudible) Indo-Pacific, the role that the Japan-U.S. alliance must play is becoming larger.
During this Japan-U.S. 2+2, in accordance with the new strategic initiative announced by the Japanese and U.S. leaders in April, the progress of various initiatives to modernize the Japan-U.S. alliance were confirmed, and opinions on the future direction were exchanged. In particular, regarding the enhancement of the respective control and command frameworks of both Japan and the U.S., which is instructed by the leaders of Japan and the U.S. to discuss at the 2+2, we have confirmed the fundamental perspective related to the control and command, including our coordination between the JJOC of the SDF and the U.S. command, and agreed to discuss further by setting up a Japan-U.S. working group.
As the supply of equipment is tightening across the world, and thus the reinforcement of the entire production capacity and the defense industry foundation of the Japan-U.S. alliance are extremely important, we welcomed the progress of the forum of Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition, and Sustainment, DICAS. Regarding the PAC-3 MSE and AIM-120 AMRAAM, we agreed to pursue coproduction opportunities that are mutually beneficial to both Japan and the U.S.
Furthermore, in order to respond to the increasing security-related challenges in the region, it is crucial to optimize the force posture of the alliance. The U.S. plan to modernize the tactical fighters of the USFJ across Japan is in alignment with the circumstances, and Japan and the U.S. will continue to cooperate towards stable operations.
On top of that, regarding the realignment of the U.S. forces, we have reaffirmed our firm commitment to the steady execution of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan in accordance with the Okinawa consolidation plan and towards the full reversion of the Air Station Futenma as soon as possible. We emphasize the importance of the acceleration of the efforts by Japan and the U.S., including the construction of the Futenma replacement facility Henoko. Furthermore, we once again confirmed that the relocation of the Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa to Guam will start this year.
In addition to that, we also checked the progress of cooperation in various areas, such as the stand of defense capability which is critical for our country to fundamentally reinforce our defense capability, the enhanced bilateral presence in the Southwest Island, ISR cooperation including BIAC, cross-domain operations including space, cyber, electromagnetics, and information warfare, which is another area of cooperation, and have firmly confirmed the direction of our efforts to achieve further outcomes with Secretary Austin and Secretary Blinken.
In addition to the Japan-U.S. 2+2, we managed to hold the Japan-U.S. Ministerial Meeting on Extended Deterrence this time. Since 2010 the Extended Deterrence Dialogue, EDD, has been held periodically at the working officials level. But in view of the severe security environment, including nuclear, it was extremely meaningful that the first ministerial meeting dedicated and standalone to extended deterrence was held where intensive discussions took place.
The Japan-U.S. alliance has been the cornerstone of our country’s security policy and has continued to be the foundation, linchpin of the peace, security, and prosperity of the region. As the free and open international order based on the rule of law are seriously challenged by unilateral changes or attempts to change the status quo by force, and the international community entering a new era of crisis, I am convinced that the Japan-U.S. alliance will become even more significant.
The Japan-U.S. 2+2 held today is an important step forward in order to pioneer such a new era. And by working together with my three reliable colleagues here with me today, I will demonstrate my steadfast determination to realize the free and open Indo-Pacific by my words and deeds.
Thank you.
MODERATOR: Thank you very much. (Inaudible) request Secretary Blinken to take the floor.
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Thank you. Well, let me first begin by thanking Foreign Minister Kamikawa, Defense Minister Kihara not only for the very warm welcome today but also for the very productive discussions. And as always, I am grateful to be joined by my friend and partner, Secretary of Defense Austin. With their indulgence, I just want to say a few words quickly about the election that will take place today in Venezuela before talking about the discussions that we had.
Venezuelans will cast their votes for president. This is a pivotal event at a pivotal time given the severe political, humanitarian, and economic crises the country faces. The United States, the international community strongly support Venezuelans’ right to vote, and we’ve championed the Barbados Agreement between the uniform opposition platform and the Maduro government to restore political freedoms to Venezuela, even though Maduro and his representatives have fallen short of many of the commitments that were made in that agreement.
Despite facing severe repression, there is enormous enthusiasm across the country about this election. The United States is not going to prejudge the outcome. This is a choice for Venezuelans to make, but the Venezuelan people deserve an election that genuinely reflects their will, free from any manipulation.
The entire international community is going to be watching this very closely. We urge all parties to honor their commitments and to respect the democratic process.
Having said that, Japan was the first country that Lloyd and I visited upon taking office. This is now my sixth visit to Japan, my 18th visit to the region over the last three and a half years. It’s a demonstration that – for over 70 years – the United States-Japan alliance has been the cornerstone for peace, for stability in the Indo-Pacific, and now beyond. And it’s helping make our own people more free, more secure, more prosperous.
Today’s meeting delivered on commitments that President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida made during the prime minister’s state visit to Washington in April, modernizing our alliance for the future. Just over the last 36 hours, we have a number of firsts, and these firsts are going to have a qualitative impact on our alliance – on its strength, on its fitness for purpose.
First, we agreed to upgrade our respective command and control structures, including a new Joint Forces Headquarters to meet the challenges of this moment.
Second, we held our first standalone ministerial on extended deterrence – demonstrating clearly, in other words, that our ironclad commitment to defend our allies with the full range of our conventional and nuclear deterrence capabilities is fully enforced.
Third, through a new forum on defense industrial cooperation, we launched coproduction of advanced missiles. We’re leveraging Japan’s manufacturing capability to collectively produce critical national security technology. We do this at a time when we’ve seen some of the challenges that we all face to our defense industrial bases. Our collaboration will strengthen our mutual capacity.
All of this underscores that our alliance has never been stronger. In fact, in my judgement it’s actually stronger than it’s ever been. This is thanks to our work over the last three and a half years. And I have to say the relationship is also deeper and broader than it’s ever been before, more ambitious than it’s ever been.
We have a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific.
We strongly oppose the PRC’s efforts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the East China Sea and the South China Sea around Taiwan. We agree on the importance of upholding peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
We continue to condemn the DPRK’s reckless and unlawful nuclear and missile programs. We’ve taken concrete steps, including increased U.S., Japan, and ROK exercises, sharing real-time missile warning data – to enhance our ability to detect and to deter threats.
We are strengthened by Tokyo’s transformational investments and policies over the last few years, from new defense strategies to a 2 percent defense spending target for their budget.
We are also here at a time where we are deepening our network of partners across the board. We have an alliance that’s anchoring a network of increasingly integrated allies and partners in the region and beyond, and in particular connecting Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
We just came from ASEAN, whose centrality remains vital to the Indo-Pacific.
Tomorrow we have a meeting of the Quad with the U.S., Japan, India, Australia.
We’re enhancing trilateral cooperation with Korea, building on the Camp David summit.
We’re also strengthening the trilateral partnership between Japan, the Philippines, and the United States. Secretary Austin and I will next go to Manila for our own U.S.-Philippines 2+2.
We’re exploring Japan cooperating on AUKUS on advanced capability projects.
And of course, we welcomed Prime Minister Kishida, as well as other Indo-Pacific partners, to the NATO summit earlier this month. That’s the third time that Japan has attended – along with Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. And what we’re seeing here is something that I think is truly new and important in the work that we’ve done, as I said, building a bridge between our Atlantic partnerships and alliances and our Indo-Pacific alliances and partnerships. It’s a reflection of the fact that security in both of these critical theaters really is indivisible, inseparable. Prime Minister Kishida was one of the ones who made this so clear, so eloquently, when just days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine he made the point that what was happening in Europe today could well happen in this region tomorrow. We deeply appreciate Japan’s strong and sustained support not only for Ukraine but also for all of the work that we’re doing together as allies and partners.
When Prime Minister Kishida addressed Congress, he reminded the United States – reminded us – excuse me – that the United States and Japan are tomodachi – the closest of friends.
He said and I quote that we stand “side by side, to ensure the survival of liberty. Not just for our people, but for all people.”
And we will continue to work with Japan as friends to do just that.
MODERATOR: Arigato. Thank you very much. So now I’d like to invite Secretary Austin to make remarks.
SECRETARY AUSTIN: Well, good evening everyone. It’s great to be back in Japan for my third visit as Secretary of Defense. Minister Kihara, Minister Kamikawa, thanks for hosting us today in Tokyo.
Under the firm leadership of President Biden, we’ve made extraordinary progress together to make this region more secure. We’ve had a truly consequential U.S.-Japan 2+2 ministerial meeting today, strengthening our partnership and adding new momentum to our shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. We are reinforcing our combined ability to deter and respond to coercive behavior in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. We’re reinforcing the rules-based international order that keeps us all safe, and the agreements that we have advanced today will ensure that the U.S.-Japan alliance remains the cornerstone of security and stability in the Indo-Pacific.
First, we welcome an historic decision to modernize our alliance command and control to better meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. The United States will upgrade the U.S. Forces Japan to a Joint Force Headquarters with expanded missions and operational responsibilities. This will be the most significant change to U.S. Forces Japan since its creation and one of the strongest improvements in our military ties with Japan in 70 years. Japan’s new Joint Operations Command will further allow our forces to work together more closely than ever, and these new operational capabilities and responsibilities will advance our collective deterrence. I look forward to our continued work with the Government of Japan and the U.S. Congress to ensure that we implement these changes effectively.
Second, we discussed ways to increase our bilateral presence in the Southwest Islands, recognizing that local coordination is crucial to sustaining our activities there.
Third, we reaffirmed the importance of cooperation and cyber security – on cyber security, ISR, cross-domain operations, and bilateral exercises and training.
And fourth, we discussed new areas for defense industrial cooperation. That includes missile coproduction, ship repair, and supply chain resilience.
And finally, we held a separate 2+2 ministerial level meeting on extended deterrence. And that has never been done before. During that meeting, I reaffirmed our ironclad commitment to defend Japan with the full range of our capabilities, including our nuclear capabilities. And let me again underscore that Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands.
And so we got a lot done. Today we unveil some of the most important advances in the U.S.-Japan defense ties in the history of our alliance. And the bottom line is clear: The U.S.-Japan alliance is stronger today than ever and getting stronger by the day. I look forward to building on this momentum and to strengthening regional peace and stability for years to come. Thanks again.
MODERATOR: (Via interpreter) Thank you very much. We will start the Q&A. Please raise your hand. When I invite you, please tell us your name and affiliation before you ask the question. Please limit your question only to one per person, and please make it clear to whom you are asking your question. So first inviting the Japanese press, please. Yes, please. Yomiuri Shimbun, Mr. Kamimura.
QUESTION: (Via interpreter) Yes, Kamimura from Yomiuri newspaper. I have my question to Minister Kamikawa and Secretary Blinken. In the surrounding areas of Japan, China is continuing its rapid military expansion, including the nuclear, and also unilateral attempts to change the status quo. And more recently, there are military exercises around Taiwan, and they are conspicuously applying military coercion on the Philippines in the South China Sea. On the other hand, Russia is approaching North Korea, which is a huge concern.
Against this backdrop, how do you regard the role to be played by Japan-U.S. alliance? And as you recognize the current situation of heightening tension in the Indo-Pacific, now there will be presidential election in November. So how would you regard the deepening of Japan-U.S. cooperation going forward, because the change of government may happen?
FOREIGN MINISTER KAMIKAWA: (Via interpreter) So let me first respond to this question. The international community is increasingly divided. Developments that have shaken the very foundation of the free and open international order are continuing. At the 2+2 meeting this time, we were able to align and coordinate the perception on the difficult regional security environment, and including the points that you have made, the outward stance of China as well as its military reactions are of serious concern. We have been able to agree that it is a concern to the region as well as the international community. We were able to share the further strategic military cooperation between Russia and China, and we were able to reaffirm the commitment to fully denuclearize North Korea.
And as for Russia-North Korea military cooperation, we have shared the concern for the possibility of military assistance from Russia to North Korea. As we see even more difficult security environment, Japan-U.S. alliance, which is the – which at the core of a security regime between our two countries, which is something indispensable not only for the security of Japan but for the peace and stability to be realized for the international community, including the Indo-Pacific. And the importance of the alliance is rising as never before.
With such perception at the 2+2 meeting this time, at the ministerial level four of us were able to have very frank and very productive discussion – more specifically on command and control, on defense equipment, as well as advanced technology cooperation and the partnership with the likeminded countries, and the presence in the – the Southwest or the Nansei Islands, and also to have cross-domain operations to have a broad-based security and defense cooperation. We were able to have discussion on that.
As for the U.S. situation, we are watching with keen interest. But in any case, in order to completely and thoroughly defend the international order, Japan and the U.S., based upon the 2+2 – the meeting outcome, we should continue to enhance our deterrence power.
SECRETARY BLINKEN: The challenges, the threats that you pointed to, are concerns not only for the United States and Japan but for many countries across the region and countries well beyond the region. The relationship between Russia and the DPRK is a two-way street, with the DPRK providing Russia with weaponry that it’s using in Ukraine, not only to continue its war of aggression against Ukraine but to attack the very principles at the heart of the international system – territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence – principles that matter not only to Ukraine, not only to countries in Europe, but to countries throughout this region.
And similarly, we see the potential for Russia to provide material assistance to the DPRK at a time when it consistently exhibits threatening, provocative behavior with missile launches, the possibility of a seventh nuclear test. That’s of deep concern to countries throughout this region. And of course, we heard that yesterday as well at the meetings of – with ASEAN, the East Asian Summit, with all and many partners.
So many of us are doing what’s necessary to strengthen our deterrence, to strengthen our defensive capacity, as well as to take necessary actions to try to prevent these countries from engaging in these activities. And that’s reflected in what we did here today. It’s reflected in so much of the work we’re doing.
It’s worth noting that our alliance, the other alliances that we’re engaged in – each and every one of them is defensive in nature. They have no ambitions toward anyone else and are – never have been, never will be offensive in nature. But at a time when, unfortunately, these threats are increasing, our alliances, our partnerships – they’re getting deeper, they’re getting stronger, they’re getting more effective.
With regard to elections for all of our democracies, that’s a feature. And what I can say with regard to the United States and Japan is we have an alliance that’s endured – but not only endured for decades, has gotten stronger. And as I think we’ve all reflected in this moment, the alliance is stronger than it’s ever been. And the reason for that is because it’s manifestly in the interests of our people – the Japanese people, the American people, people well beyond our countries. And precisely because of that interest, I think it will impact – more than I think; I know it will be sustained irrespective the outcome of the elections in either of our countries.
MODERATOR: (Via interpreter) Thank you very much. Inviting the press from the United States. Please raise your hand, please tell us your name and affiliation, and tell us to whom you are asking your question, please. Yes, please, Mr. Michael Gordon, Wall Street Journal.
QUESTION: All right. Michael Gordon, Wall Street Journal. I have a question for Secretary Austin and Japanese defense minister. Secretary Austin, as you’ve pointed out, the – a significant step has been taken by overhauling Joint Forces Command and – by turning the U.S. Forces in Japan into Joint Forces Command. But the concept that you’ve articulated here is very general, and I’d like to give you an opportunity to define it in a little more specificity given the stakes involved.
American officials have yet to spell out yet what the geographical responsibilities of this command would be. Would it be limited to the defense of Japan, or would it be broader than that? American officials have said that this command would be established through a phased approach. How long is this going to take, given the urgency of the Chinese threat? When will this be up and running? And do you anticipate that there will be a cell where U.S. and Japanese officials might meet together side by side to coordinate during a crisis? And lastly, it’s a three star command. Japan, we understand, had preferred a four star command. Have you ruled that out?
And to the Japanese defense minister, sir, would Japan prefer that this Joint Forces Command be a four star command as it is in South Korea? Would that a be a better outcome for you?
And with your indulgence, given the crisis in the Middle East, I have one quick question for Secretary Blinken. Does the U.S. assess that the rocket attack on the Golan Heights that hit the soccer field was the work of Hizballah? What steps is the U.S. taking at this juncture to avoid a wider war in that part of the world? And if war does break out, will the U.S. have Israel’s back and perhaps intervene militarily to defend Israel as it did against the Iranian missile and drone attack?
Thank you.
SECRETARY AUSTIN: Well, thanks, Michael. As that was about 30 questions as I count –(laughter) – but all wrapped into one. It’s good to see you, Michael. You heard me say earlier that this is an historic decision, and you certainly recognize that given your background. Our alliance is stronger than ever, and I think our approach to command and control has to reflect that. And the speed of action, the speed of activity that we can expect to see in the future, is such that we need to do everything we can to streamline things, to make sure that we remain relevant and decisive in the battlespace as we work together as allies.
And so I think our bilateral approach to this command and control effort reflects that. And so with the upgrade of U.S. Forces Japan to a Joint Force Headquarters, we’ll have a direct – the U.S. will have a direct leadership role in planning and leading U.S. forces in both peacetime and in potential crises. And that’ll give us an opportunity to work more closely together to ensure greater peace and stability.
Now, you mentioned – you asked how long it’s going to take given the fact that – the concerns of China presenting us challenges in the region. Our decision to move in this direction is not based upon any threat from China. It’s based on our desire and our ability to work closer together and to be more effective. And you also asked whether or not I – we’d ruled out this command ever developing into a four star command. No, we haven’t ruled that out.
Again, we’re going to continue to work with the Government of Japan. We’re going to continue to work with our Congress to make sure that we get this right. And I do believe that we’re off to a great start. And again, it’s a phased approach because, as you know, standing up a joint headquarters you can’t snap your fingers and do that overnight. There are a lot of things that you have to take into consideration, and I think that our commanders have done a great job of outlining the way ahead. And so I’m confident that this is going to add great value to our overall effort.
DEFENSE MINISTER KIHARA: (Via interpreter) If I may about the Joint Force Headquarters of the U.S., that is after the consultation between the two countries. It will be a phased approach, and it will be one of the most important counterpart of JJOC. That is what is expected. As for the details going forward, there will be a working group of both Japan and the U.S., and at this moment it has not been decided. At the moment, the USFJ is led by a three star indeed. But at any rate, the JJOC of Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. counterpart and the details I will repeat myself, but it will be up to the discussion of the working group of U.S. and Japan. In this regard on the U.S. side, the U.S. Congress will also have to be consulted and therefore that is also what we understand.
SECRETARY BLINKEN: And Michael, with regard to the Golan Heights, first let me say that we are deeply saddened by the loss of life that we saw. There is no justification for terrorism, period, and every indication is that indeed the rockets were from – or the rocket was from Hizballah.
We stand by Israel’s right to defend its citizens from terrorist attacks. And one of the reasons that we’re continuing to work so hard for a ceasefire in Gaza is not just for Gaza but also so that we can really (inaudible) an opportunity to bring calm, lasting calm, across the blue line between Israel and Lebanon. We’re determined to bring the Gaza conflict to a close. It’s gone on for far too long. It’s cost far too many lives. We want to see Israelis, we want to see Palestinians, we want to see Lebanese live free from the threat of conflict and violence.
And again, specifically with regards to the Blue Line, it’s so important that we help defuse that conflict, not only prevent it from escalating, prevent it from spreading, but to defuse it because you have so many people in both countries in both Israel and Lebanon who have been displaced from their homes – 60 or 70 thousand Israelis, roughly the same number of Lebanese. And absent a secure environment, they’re not going to be able to go home. So we’re determined to do that.
We’re in conversations with the Government of Israel. And again, I emphasize its right to defend its citizens and our determination to make sure that they’re able to do that. But we also don’t want to see the conflict escalate. We don’t want to see it spread. That has been one of our goals from day one, from October 7th on, and we’ll continue to do that. But again, the best way to do that in a sustained way is to get the ceasefire in Gaza that we’re working so hard on virtually every minute of the day.
MODERATOR: (Via interpreter) Thank you very much. And then again inviting the Japanese press. Please raise your hand. Yes, please. Mr. Tanaka, Jiji Press.
QUESTION: (Via interpreter) This is Tanaka of Jiji Press. I have a question to Minister Kihara, Secretary of State. The progress of the reinforcement of deterrence and response capabilities of the alliance has been confirmed at today’s 2+2. The extended deterrence was held at the ministerial level for the first time. How could it enhance the reliability of the extended deterrence going forward, like making the ministerial periodic? But at the same time, issues have emerged such as crimes committed by U.S. service persons in Japan or the inappropriate treatment of specifically designated secrets by Self-Defense Forces and the foundation of the alliance might be shaken? How will you deal with this with the election coming and the U.S. domestic politics overheating, and there could be a change in the administration? How will you defend the Japan-U.S. collaboration that you have deepened so far and to further develop that relationship?
DEFENSE MINISTER KIHARA: (Via interpreter) Again, let me start. First the question about the extended deterrence. As I mentioned at my initial remarks, in addition to the 2+2 that we held at the first ministerial level meeting dedicated to extended deterrence and we had an intensive discussion which was extremely significant. At this moment, nothing has been decided about the future, but also going forward through the extended deterrence dialogue held at the working level and at high-level talks such as today’s ministerial, I wish to advance our efforts to further raise the reliability of the extended deterrence of the United States.
You asked about the recent incident by the U.S. service persons and information security. During today’s 2+2, I raised the recent case that happened in Okinawa, and both myself and Minister Kamikawa, both of us mentioned that it is truly regrettable and mentioned that it is crucial to steadily implement the measures that the U.S. announced to prevent recurrence. We then agreed to properly follow up on this matter at the ministerial level as well.
But information security, yes indeed, regarding information security in the context of our discussion on the reinforcement of the deterrence and response capabilities of the alliance, the U.S. once again affirmed the importance of information security as the foundation of the alliance and discussed the deepening of our cooperation on other inappropriate treatment of specially designated secrets. I have learned that after the news went public, the deputy press secretary of the U.S. DOD said that they are confident about the relationship between Japan and U.S. Government, and that’s between the SDF and the U.S. military. But in order to maintain and strengthen better confidence of the U.S. side under my strong leadership, I will do my utmost to fundamentally reinforce the information security regime of the entire ministry.
Lastly, there was a question about the presidential election. Yes, about the U.S. presidential election and related to the future of our alliance. As the Government of Japan, it is hard for us to respond prematurely or prejudge on the election outcome, but for long that our bilateral alliance has been unwavering. And the importance of the alliance, I believe it is shared by common recognition by both the Democratic and the Republican Parties, and between the two governments at various levels such as the ministerial level, policy official levels, and between the units and the troops a close coordination have been accumulated, even during peacetime. And looking back at our history, I believe the bilateral defense cooperation have achieved concrete results based on such multilayered connections.
Regardless of the presidential election outcome, based on the new strategic initiatives announced at the leaders summit in April at our discussions, and also based on the discussion we had during this 2+2 and others, the Ministry of Defense will further advance the discussions and endeavor to achieve concrete results in order to reinforce the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. alliance.
SECRETARY AUSTIN: Well, thank you for the question. As you heard us say, this 2+2 – separate 2+2 ministerial meeting that we had on extended deterrence is the first of its kind, never been done before, and I certainly won’t go into the details of what was discussed. What I can tell you that I reaffirmed the United States commitment to defend Japan with the full range of our capabilities and that includes nuclear capabilities.
Regarding the sexual assault issue, I would just highlight for you that, number one, I agree with both ministers have said already that these are regrettable incidents and they certainly don’t reflect the core values of the United States military. And our leadership has put measures in place to ensure that these kinds of things don’t happen again in the future, and our leadership, again, is I think focused on the right things in terms of working with local leadership and working with the Government of Japan to ensure that we continue to address these issues.
On the issue of info security, I think it’s important that we be able to trust our allies and partners. And as I look at how this situation evolved, it was – as Minister Kihara has said, it was quickly identified and leadership took appropriate action and reported it. And that in and of itself creates a measure of trust that I think will serve us well going forward, and I appreciate his personal involvement to ensure that we do the right things to protect our information.
And again, whether it’s – no matter what it is, cyber issues or document security, we will continue to be challenged. All of us will continue to be challenged, and we have to do the right things to take care of our – to protect our information here.
Regarding the election and potential outcomes, again, I certainly won’t speculate on outcomes at the podium here. What I can tell you though is that I continue to see strong bipartisan support for Japan, and it’s been that way over 70 years and it will continue to be that way going forward. And anytime you see that level of bipartisan support in our government, you can expect that things will continue to improve and strengthen no matter who’s in charge. So again, I think the things that we have done here today are extraordinary and speak to that strength of commitment, that strength of relationship that we have, and I believe it’s going to be there for some time to come.
MODERATOR: Thank you very much, but unfortunately time is running so we will accept one last question from the U.S. side. So Mr. Patrick Tucker from Defense Once, please.
QUESTION: Hi, Patrick Tucker from Defense One. For Secretary Austin and Minister Kihara, you’ve mentioned today the industrial forum and agreements or understandings made about coproduction of different counterstrike capabilities. Can you give us some more details and elaborate on specifics there? Are there timelines? Is there – are there production numbers that you’re anticipating in terms of counterstrike capabilities like PAC-3 and AMRAAM missiles? What can we expect?
And for Minister Kihara and Secretary Blinken, does Japan and the United States – do you both share an understanding of the role each country would play in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in the next five years? Thank you.
SECRETARY AUSTIN: Well, thanks for the question. I don’t have any announcements to make today in terms of details on coproduction. What I can tell you though, what’s important, is that we have – we have committed to working together on producing counterstrike capability and that commitment is real. And our staffs continue to do the hard work to ensure that this becomes a reality, and I’m pretty excited about that. It will increase our – enable us to increase our magazine depth in a number of areas and increase interoperability as well.
So I think the important part here though is that we continue this work. And it is serious and earnest work, and I think that when the appropriate time comes we’ll make the announcements from the podium.
DEFENESE MINISTER KIHARA: (Via interpreter) Then if I may, that the role of U.S. and Japan and the alliance, as Secretary Austin mentioned, we have the Senkaku Islands of Japan in the case of contingency around the Senkaku that would invoke Article 5 of the security alliance. In addition to that, for specifics and details, I will refrain from discussing.
MODERATOR: Thank you very much. This is the end of the joint press conference. Thank you very much.
